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Abstract 
This policy brief argues that the COVID-19 pandemic exposes the fractures in the 
contemporary global socio-technical order and offers the prospects of several different 
alternative futures. The policy brief explores the pandemic through the lens of the multi-level 
perspective on socio-technical transitions. The pandemic is framed as a meta-transition event 
at the landscape level of unprecedented scale, pace, and pervasiveness such that it permeates 
all socio-technical regimes simultaneously. The prospects for the future are then defined on a 
matrix that compares the strength of civil society and that of economic structures. The result 
is four distinct scenarios that are linked to contemporary discourses on socio-economic 
futures: business as usual; managed transition; chaotic transition; and managed degrowth. 
The scenarios are presented as a starting point for policy discussion and the engagement of 
societal actors to define social and economic possibilities for the future, and the implications 
that the different futures would have for ecological burdens. It is concluded that the COVID 
19 pandemic can act as a catalytic event in which the legitimacy and efficacy of existing 
economic and political structures will be challenged and reshaped, and hence is an 
opportunity to redefine the ecological burdens our activities create. 
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Introduction 
Economic and social systems have been severely disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Airlines have either closed completely or severely reduced operations, with warnings of 
corporate failure and requests for government financial assistance. The automotive industry 
has seen markets and production plummet. Shops, restaurants and bars have closed. Sporting 
venues and events have been postponed or cancelled. Universities and schools have raced to 
adopt online learning, while wondering what the next academic year holds. The Organization 
for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its allies have promised a 10% reduction in 
crude oil production to bolster prices that were falling below US$25 per barrel. Public 
transport has been shunned as passengers seek spatial separation from each other. 
After many years of austerity following the 2008‒2009 financial crisis, in the face of the 
current disaster governments have suddenly been able to afford economic rescue packages 
that just a few weeks earlier would have been an anathema. In parallel, the pandemic has 
exposed the fragility of many national health systems, the lack of security in the “gig 
economy,” and the reliance on just-in-time minimum inventory global value chains. In the 
case of the Midwestern region of the United States, for example, Aaronson et al. (2020) 
estimate between nine million and 26 million potential job losses, equal to between 14% and 
18% unemployment. 
Prior to COVID-19, there was already an emergent discourse that the globalization of neo-
liberal economics was faltering amid multiple strains to social, environmental, and economic 
systems (Spinney, 2018; Flew, 2018). Indicators of this looming failure include a slow-down 
in global growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and ballooning levels of personal, 
corporate, and government debt. Strong nationalist, protectionist sentiments had emerged in 
the United States, the European Union and elsewhere, creating a tension or underlying 
conflict between globalisation and nationalism and causing some to question the corporate 
logic of global strategy (Anwar, 2020; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2020; Witt, 2019). Thus, 
COVID-19 may have acted to accelerate and focus some of these emergent strains.  
The COVID-19 pandemic has already sparked lively debate via multiple media on the role of 
the state in contemporary societies (Mair, 2020), albeit mostly in economic terms. 
Engagement with users, policy makers, and other social actors can, however, be enhanced by 
the a priori development of scenarios as a mechanism to engage in the governance of 
transitions (Schippl, 2016), and to encourage a focus on wider sustainability issues. Hence the 
scenarios proposed in this policy brief are intended for such a role. Scenarios are useful 
cameo devices to instigate discourse around possible futures. Scenarios are usually employed 
to garner a multiplicity of perspectives from different stakeholders on possible futures that 
may be more, or less, ideal. In this policy brief the use of scenarios is different. The scenarios 
are offered as alternative visions of the future in order to stimulate and guide inputs from 
stakeholders. They allow stakeholders to be more reflexive, to contemplate their current 
understanding of the situation and to engage in a scientifically informed consideration of the 
future from this point.  
The contribution takes the following form. First, the basis of alternative transitions is 
outlined, drawing on the “whole system” perspective of transitions theory. Thereafter, the 
four potential scenario thumbnails are described, and then related against the multi-level 
perspective (MLP) concepts of landscape, regime, and niche (Geels, 2002; Geels et al., 
2020). Finally, the discussion section considers the implications of the contemporary 
situation for the prospects of the scenarios coming to pass. 
 
Alternative meta-transitions 
Transitions theory has usually been used to analyze specific components of contemporary 
socio-economic systems such as energy, mobility, or food. However, COVID-19 pandemic 
has had a powerful impact at a higher level of aggregation. While specific systems and places 
are not all affected equally, the coronavirus outbreak has been notable for being global, rapid, 
and exceptionally pervasive in the way it has disrupted existing practices. The crisis is, 
therefore, in the language of the multi-level perspective, a meta-transition event at the 
landscape level that permeates into multiple regimes simultaneously. Transitions theory 
considers and integrates multiple system elements into an analysis, including technology and 
innovation, markets, business, government, behaviors and norms, regulatory and governance 
frameworks, and change pathways. Figure 1 distils these insights. The scenarios are expanded 
upon in the next section. 
 
Figure 1. Framing alternative post-COVID 19 futures 
 
 
In Figure 1, the complexity of the situation at global and national levels is much reduced, and 
it is likely that specific empirical inquiry is needed to investigate the regime and country-
level implications of the post-COVID-19 period. However, the prevailing conditions for 
systemic change are defined in terms of two main characteristics: civil society (the state, 
governance and regulation), and the economy (business, markets, finance and economics). In 
a sense this binary positioning reflects the global-national tensions alluded to above, where 
elements of society are questioning the benefits of globalisation. 
The pandemic has affected different parts of the economy differentially. Those intimately 
concerned with globalisation have been subject to the strongest constraints. Hence 
international air travel, shipping and trade have all suffered. Activities involving the 
congregation of people have also suffered, while those involving home delivery of products 
and services, or medical and pharmaceutical activities have prospered. It is likely that small 
businesses and the self-employed are more vulnerable now, while in the future it is probable 
that capital-intensive industries that need high levels of capacity utilisation will also be 
vulnerable. However, in terms of the scenarios, the notion of weakness in business and the 
economy relates more to general macro-economic conditions where shortage of capital, weak 
demand, and fragile supply chains mean that the assumptions that underpin day-to-day 
business activity may no longer apply. 
If civil society is weaker in the post-COVID-19 period, then it is possible to envisage two 
broad outcomes. In the first outcome, when capitalist economic structures remain intact and 
when stimulation measures are successful there is a broad return to “business as usual,” along 
with the prevailing trajectories on carbon emissions, pollution, resource consumption, and 
other indicators of ecological stress. This scenario can be equated to neo-liberal economics 
and the free market system, albeit with multiple national variations. In the second outcome, a 
weak civil society coupled with frail business and economic systems brings the prospect of 
“chaotic transition” wherein there will be a rapid but unorganized system rebalancing around 
much lower levels of wealth creation and material consumption. This theoretical position is 
compatible with “doomsday” or “catastrophe” perspective, for example, seen in fears of a 
nuclear winter in the event of an all-out nuclear war (Baum et al., 2015; Coupe et al., 2019) 
 
If civil society is stronger in the post-COVID-19 period, there will be enhanced legitimacy to 
pursue civil and social agendas. The primacy afforded to business and the economy is eroded. 
Hence, the ability to constrain ecological burdens becomes possible. Again, there are two 
variants that can be envisaged. With business and the capitalist economy still intact, and 
materialism generally still supported, the COVID-19 pandemic could provide the conditions 
for a renewed and global “green new deal” centered on sustainable consumption and the 
circular material economy. This perspective is compatible with theories on green growth and 
the de-coupling of ecological burdens from economic activity (Stoknes and Rockström, 
2018). Alternatively, a more radical vision for societal futures would result in the deliberate 
shrinking of the material economy in the form of a managed contraction of economic activity. 
This final scenario is compatible with the theoretical perspective of degrowth (Kerschner et 
al., 2018). These scenarios are discussed below. 
 
Four scenarios for a post-COVID-19 world 
Despite decades of innovations for enhanced sustainability, and multiple governmental 
regulatory interventions, the burdens imposed on the global ecological system have increased 
over time (Cohen, 2020). In consequence, there has been a growing interest in understanding 
the barriers to transition, and the enabling of potential pathways in transitions, especially but 
not exclusively with respect to energy (Pregger et al., forthcoming). Osazuwa-Peters et al. 
(2020) for example argue that risk as understood by local citizens is critical in evaluating 
alternative energy supply and hence is a predictor of pathway choice. An event such as 
COVID-19 is of such a magnitude as to foster a re-evaluation of risk in many aspects of 
society. 
In principle, transitions theory can inform the construction of alternative scenarios, which can 
then be used to generate illustrative outcomes (McDowall, 2014; Angheloiu et al., 2017). 
Nonetheless, a concern with validation of this type is that unforeseen or unprecedented events 
may occur, and these may be precisely the “regime changing” occurrences that could have a 
significant impact on future outcomes. Scenarios are inevitably also concerned with multiple 
agents of possible change, and of interactions between agents (Tavasszy et al., 2015; 
Zukunftsinstitut, 2020). It is recognized in the transitions literature that there are competing 
visions for the future (Geels et al., 2015). In this policy brief, we seek an explicit exploration 
of those competing visions through scenarios. 
The scenarios are not “good ideas gone wrong” as discussed by Sconfienza (2020). Rather, 
they are intended as coherent visions of the future linked to distinct theoretical positions in 
the literature. Four scenarios are defined in this contribution and summarized in Table 1 using 
the MLP framework.  
 
Business as usual 
The return to the business-as-usual scenario includes the idea that attempts are made to return 
economies and trading relations to “normal” even though in reality there might be a 
protracted period until that normality is achieved. Therefore, trends in evidence before the 
COVID 19 pandemic will recommence, and future changes of significance are incremental 
and readily forecastable (Hickman and Banister, 2007). It is underpinned by the neoclassical 
economic concept of optimization (Grubb et al., 2015). The scenario anticipates that global 
trade broadly persists, and that debt-enabled material consumption continues to underpin 
economic growth measured in GDP. The socio-technical regimes continue to be self-
regulating, while landscape-level pressures are not so profound as to demand drastic and 
enduring changes. Technological innovation and “normal” competition continue to result in 
eco-efficiencies, but such efficiencies are largely negated by continued growth in overall 
consumption. This is a contentious scenario, as there were prior to the COVID-19 crisis 
indications of structural overcapacity in key activities such shipping (Morley, 2016; SMEA, 
20017; IHS, 2015). There was also an emergent discourse on the failure of globalisation 
(Flew, 2020). This scenario therefore assumes that protectionist forces are subdued by the 
situation after the pandemic, and that the economic benefits of global integration are accepted 
as the best way forward. This scenario is expressed by the World Trade Organisation which 
in April 2020 anticipated a significant fall in global trade of 13% to 32% in 2020 compared 
with 2019, but then with a resumption to year-on-year growth (Walker, 2020; WTO, 2020; 
see also IMF, 2020). 
Managed transition 
This scenario represents the ecologically helpful restructuring of economies with technology 
delivering more sustainable production and consumption (Geels, 2014; Geels et al., 2014). 
Ultimately the scenario implies the successful establishment of circular economic systems 
that in turn require reduced consumption of fossil fuels and other natural resources. There 
would be a genuine de-coupling of material and energy consumption from economic 
prosperity (Stoknes and Rockström, 2018). 
Managed transition therefore also embraces the policy position of “green growth” being 
delivered by both public and private sectors, working in partnership despite the non-linear 
and unpredictable character of the changes to the socio-economic system that would have to 
be endured (Capasso et al., 2019). The scenario still envisages a significant role for 
companies that can bring to bear significant competencies, skills, technological prowess, and 
financial resources (Ansah and Sorooshian, 2019). In this respect, managed transition is the 
logical development of the “Porter hypothesis” that states that strong state regulation for 
environmental and other reasons is beneficial to companies (Wang et al., 2019). Nonetheless, 
managed transition for reduced resource intensity also implies the rapid decommissioning of 
much invested capital in a negotiated process involving multiple nation states, international 
bodies, and other key actors. Hence this scenario assumes that the regulatory and governance 
mechanisms of globalisation remain intact, even if the economic mechanisms are reduced, 
such that there remains a global consensus on the need to be above narrowly nationalist and 
isolationalist policy actions. 
The COVID 19 outbreak may act to “kick start” the process of managed transition in that 
regime actors could change behaviors relative to the business-as-usual scenario. The overall 
result is an accelerating process whereby carbon emissions and other ecological burdens are 
reduced, before stabilizing around a new regime structure. Sustainability burdens in total are 
thus substantially below the business-as-usual scenario, but still end up higher than the latter 
two scenarios. 
Chaotic transition 
At the level of individual societies, history is replete with examples of catastrophic collapse 
from diverse causes (Tainter, 1988). These cases have all been spatially bounded rather than 
global in scope, and may result in the large-scale dispersal of the affected populations as 
migrants or refugees, as frequently happens in times of war. Countries or societies that have 
endured calamitous events of this magnitude may struggle to recover.  
Prior to the arrival of COVID-19, the prospects for a global scale catastrophic event appeared 
to be confined to nuclear war, which could result in sudden and widespread devastation. In 
contrast, the ecological crisis brought on by encroaching on planetary limits has been seen as 
somehow less existential, less immediate, and less comprehensive. As Taleb (2007) has 
previously argued, significant discontinuous events are notoriously difficult to forecast, and 
partly for this reason their impact is particularly acute (Turchin, 2008; 2016; Blythe, 2009). 
Chaotic transition may result from landscape pressures manifest across societies and their 
economies (Motesharrei et al., 2014; 2017). 
Yet the prospect of a collapse of the global economic order is not now so far-fetched. Even 
prior to the COVID-19 pandemic there was some evidence of a process of disengagement and 
isolationism for example as pursued by the United States since the 2016 election (see, for 
example, BBC, 2018). In this scenario the tension between a faltering globalisation and a 
resurgent defensive nationalism leads to the fragmentation and ultimate collapse of global 
regulation and governance mechanisms. Furthermore, as has already been made evident from 
the short-term impact of the crisis, the result of economic collapse is also a concomitant 
reduction in ecological burdens. Hence, the COVID-19 outbreak could be the “trigger event” 
that cascades repercussions through the entire socio-technical system, and be of such a scale 
and pace that prevailing regulation and governance tools are unequal to the task of 
stabilization. 
Managed degrowth 
In managed degrowth the deliberate aim is to reduce an economy in scale (Kallis, 2011). It is 
argued that landscape pressures can only be resolved by drastic de-consumption, and a 
rejection of materialism as a measure of economic success. Economic growth is incompatible 
with ecological sustainability, but ultimately requires socialism (Kallis, 2019). One of the 
principal issues in this scenario is the balance between managed degrowth in developed 
economies and the need for economic growth in developing countries. Developing nations 
are likely to see degrowth as a first-world problem, and such an approach will require a 
careful balancing or rebalancing of the global economy. Manged degrowth therefore implies 
that global structures and co-operation remain intact, even if globalisation as a neo-market 
concept ceases to exist. A much higher degree of national autonomy is likely. 
The overall characteristics of each scenario for the post-COVID 19 future are summarized in 
Table 1 using the MLP framework. 
 
Table 1. Scenarios for shipping using the MLP framework 
 
Scenario Landscape Level Regime Level Niche Level Ecological 
Burdens 
Business 
as usual 
 
Steady global GDP 
growth; reductions in 
ecological burdens in 
some sectors creating 
“headroom” for others. 
Growth in regime scale, 
but overall stable 
membership of regime 
actors and agents. 
Some niche 
technology 
developments in 
specialist 
applications 
 
 
 
 
 
Managed 
transition  
Green growth strategy; 
de-couple resource 
consumption from 
GDP; reduced material 
consumption per capita. 
Stronger regulation and 
policy toward resource 
consumption. Regime 
actors remain, but scale 
is reduced over time. 
Strong 
encouragement of 
emergent 
technologies and 
fuel-efficiency 
measures. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chaotic 
transition  
Environmental, 
economic and political 
collapse on a global 
scale 
Collapse of intermediary 
governance 
organizations. 
No new 
technologies or 
operational 
practices. 
 
 
 
Managed 
degrowth 
 
Chronic material 
shortages; strong 
regulation at 
international level; 
rapid restoration of 
some environmental 
degradation. 
Sequential 
deconstruction of main 
regime actors and 
participants. 
Potentially 
significant 
innovation in 
alternatives to 
existing production 
and consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Under “(return to) business-as-usual” conditions, ecological burdens will continue to rise as 
global structures of production and consumption return. Governments and international 
agencies are already taking extreme measures so that economies do not collapse, a return to 
“normal” life will be possible. Recovery of stock markets and other financial institutions to 
pre-COVID 19 levels will at best take a period of years. So, the return to business as usual is 
likely to include a short-term reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emission levels (as an 
example), as also occurred during the 2008‒2009 financial crisis, before the long-term trend 
line returns with growing pollution (see, e.g., Jonkeren et al, 2011). Moreover, the desire to 
restart economies could result in the postponement of ongoing carbon-reduction regulation 
and other environmental measures, including in shipping. It is already apparent that the 
COVID-19 crisis has precipitated fractured relationships within socio-technical systems at 
landscape and regime levels. The established agents of global stabilization such as the World 
Trade Organisation, World Bank, United Nations, World Health Organisation, and Inter-
Governmental Panel on Climate Change had, prior to the emergence of this virus, seen an 
erosion of their legitimacy and viability. The danger here is that without such checks and 
balances, the return to business as usual will accelerate the ecological crisis. 
Under the other three scenarios, it is suggested that there is room for optimism, provided the 
very real social and political hurdles can be surmounted. It may be considered that chaotic 
transition and managed degrowth are less likely than managed transition or a return to 
business as usual. However, an event of this magnitude throws forth multiple unanticipated 
repercussions. Here, the issue of time is very important. The longer that the crisis endures, the 
more distant a return to business as usual becomes. Countries are differentially positioned, 
being more or less wedded to the global economy, more or less able to enhance self-reliance, 
and with affinity to materialism in general. These dimensions are likely to determine the 
pathway adopted hereon.  
In the “Managed Transition” scenario, de-coupling resource consumption from GDP, greater 
global political consensus, stronger regulation and policy toward business, and 
encouragement of emergent technologies are likely to lead to a net decline in ecological 
burdens (Geels et al., 2015). As noted above, this scenario requires strong cooperation 
between the existing regime constituents around a form of global “new green deal.” It is 
notable that interest in green growth emerged following the global financial crisis of 2008‒
2009, with notable institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) seeing the strategy as a twin economic and ecological solution 
(Girouard, 2011; Borel-Saladin and Turok, 2013; Ferguson 2015). Prior to emergence of the 
COVID-19 pandemic there was a growing perception that green growth was failing to deliver 
the required pace and scale of carbon-emissions reductions at national or international level 
(Zhang, 2015). 
In the “Chaotic Transition” scenario, which was first proposed by Meadows et al. (1972) in 
the context of global resource depletion, the environmental, economic, and political systems 
collapse at a global scale. In consequence, this would bring about a return to isolationism, and 
widespread business failure, with little or no innovation, which would in turn result in 
significant reductions in ecological burdens (Tainter, 1988). This scenario is evidently highly 
disruptive, with potentially cataclysmic impacts on societies around the world and myriad 
secondary impacts such as mass migrations and large-scale conflicts. This sort of 
transdisciplinary scenario is described as Cliodynamics by Turchin (2008). 
Finally, in the “Managed Degrowth” scenario, global material shortages, stronger regulation 
at an international level, and innovation in alternatives to conventional economic growth 
would lead to a rapid decline in ecological burdens before a steady state at a lower level 
occurs (Kallis, 2011). In this scenario the “new normal” is a radical rebalancing of work, 
production, and consumption with prevailing themes of dematerialized lifestyles, shared 
work, green taxes, and the erosion of private wealth (Kallis, 2017). Over time, a shift in 
emphasis toward re-use and recycling will drive down net resource consumption. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The stridency of pro-market political and institutional voices on the importance of getting 
economies “back to work” is indicative of the magnitude of the challenge posed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic to the prevailing order. Yet the prevailing order was already under 
some threat as collective institutions were struggling to retain legitimacy and cohesion in the 
face of powerful economic and social contradictions (Müller, 2017). Nationalist and de-
globalisation sentiments from both the traditional left and right wings of the political 
spectrum were in evidence (Heinisch et al., 2020). As this policy brief argues, there is a 
multiplicity of alternatives available. The scenarios are caricatures. The future is likely to 
contain elements of several of them and will be heavily dependent upon the historic legacy 
and specific endowments of different countries. 
 
The almost universal retreat into a defensive nationalism does not auger well for a managed 
transition, despite the breathing space afforded to ecological system by this hiatus in 
economic activity. With so much manufacturing, logistics, distribution, and retail capacity 
lying idle, and with so many people suffering reduced wages or unemployment, the short-
term benefits of “business as usual” will be compelling. Yet there are also positive signs. 
Public health services have rarely been so highly valued and appreciated. The general 
willingness of accept the privations and restrictions of “lockdowns” shows an underlying 
sense of community, collectivity and public spirit. Many businesses demonstrated an ability 
to produce socially useful products at surprisingly short notice. Some of the societal risks of 
globalization have been recognised. Perhaps individuals have come to appreciate that less 
money and more time is a good thing. Most importantly, there is a palpable sense we have 
agency, we can change, and that different futures come from making different decisions in 
the present. 
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